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The World Trade Organisation's Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights [TRIPS] agreement aimed to
harmonise intellectual property rights and patent protection globally. In India, the signing of this
agreement resulted in a sharp increase in clinical trials since 2005. The Indian government, along with
larger Indian pharmaceutical companies, believed that they could change existing commercial research
cultures through the promotion of basic research as well as attracting international clinical trials, and
thus create an international level, innovation-based drug industry. The effects of the growth of these
outsourced and off-shored clinical trials on local commercial knowledge production in India are still
unclear. What has been the impact of the increasing scale and commercialisation of clinical research on
corporate science in India?
In this paper we describe Big-pharmaceuticalisation in India, whereby the local pharmaceutical in-
dustry is moving from generic manufacturing to innovative research. Using conceptual frameworks of
pharmaceuticalisation and innovation, this paper analyses data from research conducted in 2010e2012
and describes how Contract Research Organisations (CROs) enable outsourcing of randomised control
trials to India. Focussing on twenty-ﬁve semi-structured interviews CRO staff, we chart the changes in
Indian pharmaceutical industry, and implications for local research cultures.
We use Big-pharmaceuticalisation to extend the notion of pharmaceuticalisation to describe the spread
of pharmaceutical research globally and illustrate how TRIPS has encouraged a concentration of capital in
India, with large companies gaining increasing market share and using their market power to rewrite
regulations and introduce new regulatory practices in their own interest. Contract Research Organisa-
tions, with relevant, new, epistemic skills and capacities, are both manifestations of the changes in
commercial research cultures, as well as the vehicles to achieve them. These changes have reinvigorated
public concerns that stress not only access to newmedicines but also the ‘price’ of innovation on research
participants.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Introduction
India signed the World Trade Organisation's [WTO] Trade
Related Intellectual Property Rights [TRIPS] agreement in 1995. Thisealth Bioethics Network, The
lth, University of Oxford, Old
iola).
tives) IIT-M's Rural Technol-
am, Taramani, Chennai, India.
re, India.
Ltd. This is an open access article uagreement aimed at harmonising intellectual property rights and
patent protection globally. India's decision to sign was controver-
sial: civil society activists were convinced that this would reduce
Indian people's access to cheap drugs, and many representatives of
India's generics drug companies feared the loss of their right to
reverse-engineer products that were patent-protected elsewhere
in the world through a process that involves the separation, iden-
tiﬁcation and precise estimation of quantities of ingredients in a
formulation, for characterization of a competitor's product and the
development of a generic alternative (Ramanna, 2003). While a few
large-scale companies and most small-scale generics companiesnder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
S. Sariola et al. / Social Science & Medicine 131 (2015) 239e246240remained opposed, most Indian large-scale producers welcomed
the opportunity to access high-incomemarkets, and the prospect of
becoming innovator companies themselves (Smith, 2000). Signing
the TRIPS agreement required changes to the 1970s Patent Act that
provided Indian companies the same protection for their in-
novations as companies elsewhere, encouraging them to shift their
focus from production of generic drugs to innovation of New
Chemical Entities (Schüren, 2013). During the 1995e2005 grace
period, for example, the Indian pharmaceutical companies Dr
Reddy's and Ranbaxy were able to secure patents on novel com-
pounds and venture out to international markets with them
(Chaturvedi and Chataway, 2006).
Extending patent protection to drugs produced in India is,
however, but one side of the story of pharmaceuticalisation. One
important result of this process has been an increase in the quest
for new markets and drug products that has led to an expansion of
research organisations, and created new social actors. Legislative
changes to implement TRIPS in India made possible not only
increased access by innovator companies to the Indian market, but
also the introduction of internationally-funded clinical trials. A
change in Schedule Yof the Indian Drugs and Cosmetics Act in 2005
removed a phase-lag on clinical trials: pharmaceutical companies
could now ‘conduct trials of new drugs in India at the same time
that trials of the same phase are being conducted in other countries’
(Nundy and Gulhati, 2005: p.1633). Data on clinical trials published
in the Indian Journal for Medical Ethics show an increase from 64
new trials in 2006 to 245 in 2010 (Ravindran et al., 2010) and up to
787 in 2012 (Ravindran and Vaid, 2013), suggesting a 1100% in-
crease in 6 years. However, on global scale India held only 1%
clinical trials in 2007 (Thiers et al., 2008). Indian companies also
increased their own clinical trials, testing new chemical entities of
their own and entering into contracts with international com-
panies. The growth in clinical trials activity allowed innovator
companies to sponsor trials both directly and through Contract
Research Organisations [CROs] (Drabu et al., 2010; Yee, 2012). The
impacts of TRIPS agreement on patent laws and on the encour-
agement of clinical trials seemingly pull in different directions, but
that they are in fact enmeshed processes. This very particular tra-
jectory of pharmaceuticalisation deserves to be unpicked in detail:
how have these transformations in the terms of market competi-
tion changed research cultures? The signiﬁcant role played by CROs
in enabling this process is the central focus of this paper.
The pharmaceuticalisation thesis has evolved out of the work of
Abraham (2010, 2011; also see Davis and Abraham, 2013), and
Williams et al. (2011) who suggest that, at the most basic level of
the deﬁnition, drugs are increasingly seen as pre-eminent solutions
to health problems. Abraham argues that drivers of pharmaceu-
ticalisation include ‘the redeﬁnition of health problems’ and
‘changing forms of governance’ and note that ‘pharmaceutical in-
dustry marketing, consumerism, and the ideology of the “expert
patient’’ are important factors in the process (Abraham, 2010).
Williams et al., (2011, p.719) stress in addition that ‘pharmaceutical
futures are shaping how we think about innovation, policy and the
very meaning of health and illness, therapy and enhancement’,
largely referring to pharmacogenomics and its potentials. This
debate has, ﬁrstly, been carried out largely as a discussion of
changes within ‘Western’ societies: India appears merely as a
source of cheap pharmaceuticals. Secondly, it has failed to take
seriously the globalisation of particular kinds of pharmaceuticali-
sation as part of an emergent neo-liberal market form and associ-
ated discourses and practices. Here, we argue that India (perhaps
more clearly than elsewhere) is experiencing ‘Big-pharmaceutic-
alisation’. By this we mean the following:a. TRIPS has encouraged a concentration of capital, with large
companies gaining increasing market share and using their
market power to rewrite regulations and regulatory practices in
their own interest;
b. New social forms associated with these changes have been
introduced into India e international multi-sited clinical trials
and Contract Research Organisations, and have developed new
epistemic skills and capacities, as well as regulatory frameworks
and practices;
c. Public contests have been reinvigorated over the well-being of
local populations, be they concerning access to pharmaceuticals
or the health of trial participants. Concerns stress not only ac-
cess to new patentedmedicines but also the ‘price’ of innovation
on research participants, and the regulatory structures that
should govern clinical trials and research participation.
Pharmaceuticalisation describes how drug production and
manufacturing, along with their sales, branch out to ever more
widening global regions (Abraham, 2010, 2011; Bell and Figert,
2012; Williams et al., 2011, 2012). A substantial literature analyses
the introduction of clinical trials into developing countries and
emerging economies (Kamat, 2014; Petryna, 2009; Sariola and
Simpson, 2011; Sunder Rajan, 2005). We extend the deﬁnition of
pharmaceuticalisation to include the globalisation of pharmaceu-
tical knowledge production by means of clinical trials. Petryna
(2009) describes how when CROs ‘go global’, they work across
national and cultural boundaries, spread the methodologies, skills
and ideas of the pharmaceutical sector, and facilitate the increase in
clinical trial activity in countries like India, China and Brazil. We
agree with other analysts of commercial research and pharma-
ceuticals that such clinical trials ought not be considered ‘science’
but rather a mechanistic, pre-deﬁned test (Bachelard, 1953, quoted
in Gaudilliere and L€owy, 1998, p.10; Cooper, 2012).
Changes within these new locations, and how existing practices
are morphed into new settings, need further analysis. When in-
ternational pharmaceutical companies outsource trials in search of
new markets and treatment-naïve patients, they transform the
existing pharmaceutical sector, harmonising it to resemble more
closely international or ‘Big Pharma’. Big-pharmaceuticalisation
involves the introduction of CROs, who implement research for
international and national pharmaceutical companies, into India.
Working with sponsors, doctors on trial sites where patients are
recruited, and at times biotechnology companies doing basic
research, CROs are actors in their own right. They reinforce how
Randomised Control Trials (RCTs) become central to a particular
form of knowledge production, and begin to displace pre-existing
generic drug production regimes. Thus, Big-pharmaceuticalisation
stands for both the arrival of CROs, trials, and the new social
forms e regulatory and human capital e that come with them, as
well as the process through which India is becoming more like the
international sector. CROs are both vehicles and manifestations of
this change.
The TRIPS agreement subverted the past reverse-engineering
policy, as innovative products can now be patented in India and
international companies can include India in multi-sited trials.
Arguments concerning these changes are polarised. Innovation-
management literature sees them as economic opportunities for
the industry (Chataway et al., 2007; Chaturvedi and Chataway,
2006; Chittoor et al., 2009; Gehl Sampath, 2007; Kale, 2009,
2010; Kale and Little, 2007; Kale and Wield, 2008). Others argue
that therapeutic access, patients' rights, and the state's re-
sponsibilities in health care provision for its citizens are all
threatened. India's new Patents Act has clauses that include public
health concerns as reasons to deny a patent. They are designed to
check 'ever-greening', whereby drug companies exploit legal
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new drugs that have small adjustments to the chemical composi-
tion of the original ones e combining formulae or making timed-
release versions, for example e thus making it harder for generic
producers to market their competitor drugs once the initial patent
has expired. The Patent act also provides justiﬁcations for
'compulsory licensing', whereby generics companies can apply to
produce a generic version of a patented pharmaceutical if it is being
marketed at prices beyond the reach of Indian consumers, or in
only small quantities. These clauses are constantly under pressure
from international pharmaceutical companies and the US and other
governments, with Novartis and Bayer challenging these clauses in
Indian courts. Drawing on the Novartis case, Sunder Rajan (2011,
p.983) argues that in such bioconstitutional moments ‘rights are
reframed in the context of emergent co-productions between law
and the life sciences’. Quantiﬁcations of effect and monetary value
take primacy. According to these readings, the TRIPS agreement has
had a detrimental impact on patients in India and internationally by
progressively limiting the access of poor people to affordable
pharmaceuticals.
Increasing trial activity has realigned concerns over the ethics
and politics of pharmaceuticals. The safety of experimental sub-
jects, and how this can be best regulated, are high-proﬁle concerns.
New regulations as well as new institutions, namely private and
public Research Ethics Committees (Simpson et al., 2015), have
been established, but critics see the increase in clinical trials as
coercive and beneﬁcial neither for the individuals nor the com-
munities involved (Petryna, 2009; Sunder Rajan, 2005). Kamat
(2014) and Prasad (2009) question bioethical and legal ap-
proaches that have limited their analyses to patient autonomy and
recruitment of trial participants, and call for broader discussions of
social justice. Tighter regulatory changes were put in place in 2013
and a number of international sponsors pulled out from India
(Brennan 16 Oct 2013; The Economic Times 27 Jan 2014; Vijay 1 Feb
2014). The central argument of supporters of clinical trials e that a
more permissive atmosphere regarding drug research and devel-
opment (R&D) could build the capacities of Indian researchers and
industries to enable them to become originators of new molecules
ewas reiterated by industry spokespeople. But themeans bywhich
change is promoted cannot be separated from the outcomes
(Strathern, 2011). How far do the activities of CROs provide evi-
dence of changes in the direction claimed when India signed up to
the WTO? What happens in these relationships and how do the
CROs operate? Here, we pay attention to industry-industry re-
lations as clinical trials spread across national boundaries, and
outline how CRO staff in India see their role in the local pharma-
ceutical sector. We address an empirical gap in the literature by
providing insights into the kinds of collaborations that CROs
establish nationally, how they make connections with those that
they work with e research sites and pharmaceutical companies e
what their roles and concerns in the process are, and how they
respond to the regulatory changes around them. We ask how far
and why Indian industry has transformed as a result of the 2005
regulatory changes.
2. Methodology
This paper is part of a larger project, that mapped the increase of
experimental clinical and public health research in South Asia
entitled Biomedical and Health Experimentation in South Asia. To
document how the arrival of clinical trials and CROs takes place, we
interviewed people in various positions in CROs in India. In-
terviewees were gathered by snowball sampling: we contacted
CRO staff via existing networks, and followed up contacts they
provided us with. We conducted 25 semi-structured interviews in11 different CROs or CRO-related consultancies based in Bangalore,
Mumbai, and Delhi. These interviewees were from both Indian and
international CROs and their studies were sponsored by both in-
ternational and Indian pharmaceutical and biotech companies. The
CROs conducted multi-sited RCTs as well as comparisons of ge-
nerics and biosimilars. Three CROs were originally Indian organi-
sations that had merged with international partners, and the rest
were international CROs with ofﬁces in India.
Our interviews covered research and development, research
capacity, the challenges of doing research in India, and in-
terviewees' perceptions and ideas about their role in the broader
pharmaceutical sector. Interviewswere conducted by the ﬁrst three
authors, often in pairs, in 2011. Research participants were provided
with information sheets regarding the study, told about its aims,
and offered assurances that the project was academic, rather than
scandal-seeking.
The junior Clinical Research Assistants acting as monitors we
interviewed held Undergraduate and Master's Degrees in Biotech-
nology, Dentistry and Ayurvedic Medicine. Other CRO staff roles
included Project and Operations Managers with overall re-
sponsibilities for trials; Business Managers who interacted with
Sponsors trying to secure new projects, Protocol Writers who
worked together with Sponsors spelling out research designs and
planning studies; Quality Assurers who checked all datasets before
handing them over to sponsors; Statisticians who made relevant
quantitative analyses; and CEOs who acted as intellectual and
public relations heads of the companies. These more senior posi-
tions included people with Medical Degrees (MBBS and MD),
Masters in Pharmacy and Pharmacology as well as PhDs in Phar-
macology. Some had international degrees and all the interviewees
had previously worked in international pharmaceutical companies
in India and other CROs, bringing their learning with them.
We obtained written informed consent from participants. In-
terviews were held in English, recorded, transcribed, anonymised,
and coded using Atlas.ti. Transcripts were coded by the ﬁrst three
authors with regular checks for consistency. Codes relevant to the
paper include: ‘knowledge production’, ‘innovation’, ‘new social
forms’, ‘regulation and governance’ and ‘collaboration’. The mate-
rial was analysed and written up by Sariola while the other authors
commented and edited the drafts. In this paper we analyse the
interviews with respect to how companies positioned themselves
in international outsourcing process and innovation.
The study had ethical clearance from Anusandhan Trust in
Mumbai where the research was based, and also from University of
Edinburgh where the project's Principal Investigator was based. In
what follows, we discuss ﬁrstly the perceptions of CRO staff with
respect to changes after 1995, and particularly since 2005, and
different models of collaboration that have emerged between in-
ternational trial sponsors and Indian CROs. We then consider the
tensions that arise between the commercial and national economic
interests in maximising the numbers of trials and the income these
activities generate, in the context of rising concerns about the
ethical issues raised by such trials, before turning to review the new
regulatory institutions and practices that have arisen.3. Findings
3.1. From self-sufﬁciency to innovation: Contract Research
Organisations in India
Interviewees described the changes in the Indian pharmaceu-
tical sector as a trajectory from self-sufﬁciency to innovation.
During the era of self-sufﬁciency prior to TRIPS, they argued, cheap
drugs were needed en massewhilst clinical trials were not required
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global CRO put it:
It was like, just show me chemically that whatever you're doing is
equivalent to that chemical entity manufactured, [and] go sell it. I
don't need you to test on anything. That was the basic requirement.
By 2005, as the CRO consultant cited below argued, the nation
had evolved and the industry was ready to move onto the ‘next’
level. An experimental capitalist, open-market era was seen as
‘progress’ but the rhetoric of beneﬁts to masses remained
embedded in speciﬁc discourses concerning CRO operations and
motivations:
[Prior to TRIPS] So that was a huge plan, rolling out mass health-
care … For that, primary thing was to have affordable medicines.
So that's why we said, we will not follow the patent rule which is
being followed by the world, but will create something which we
could self-sufﬁce. But by 2005, we said okay, now we will go ahead
and follow the patent regime which is being followed across the
world, because I think to a very large extent we had taken care of
the health needs of the population.
With TRIPS, the number of clinical trials and CROs in India
started to increase. As one of our interviewees described it:
‘Everybody and anybody has come here.’ International as well as local
pharmaceutical companies and CROs took the opportunity to make
use of the large populations of India, expecting to run standardised
operations, as the head of a Human Pharmacology Unit in an Indian
CRO said:
If a CRO is involved in a study, it is exactly how it works in the
western countries.
The internal operations of CROs as they were described to us
resemble those of international CROs described by Fisher (2009)
and Petryna (2009). Our interviewees explained that when an in-
ternational pharmaceutical or biotechnology companywants to run
a trial in India, they contact a CRO based there, an Indian CRO or the
side-ofﬁces of large international CROs like Quintiles. CROs adver-
tise their services online as well as in international conferences.
Typical selling points are: ‘understanding of local regulatory cul-
tures’, ‘ability to recruit participants fast’ and ‘producing high-
quality data’. CROs carry out central tasks in the knowledge pro-
duction chain and yet their names do not appear in the trial data-
bases set up by regulators, nor in outputs such as publications. Until
changes introduced in 2013 that required all implementing par-
ticipants in clinical research to be certiﬁed, CROs had not been
regulated in India and estimates of their numbers vary widely. The
Indian Association of Contract Research Organisations lists 34 CROs
as members, some of which are international, while Kamat (2014)
provides an unreferenced estimate of 150.
Depending on the collaborative model in place between the
sponsor who owns the intellectual property and the CRO, the entire
process of drug development can be broken down, compartmen-
talised, and the standardised work can be outsourced and offsh-
ored. While protocol writing is mostly done by sponsors,
applications to ethics committees and the Drugs Controller General
of India's ofﬁce, data collection, quality assurance, safety manage-
ment, monitoring of investigators, medical writing, pharmacovi-
gilance, etc. are all, to some extent, managed from within India.
CROs are paid according to the tasks that they conduct and
numbers of trial participants recruited. In some cases, CROs have
close relationships with a particular international or Indiandiscovery biotech, and also take part in the development of
experimental compounds. Many CROs have phase 1 facilities and
also conduct later phases. However, in all cases, CROs also act as
middle-men for experimentation for international pharmaceutical
companies. When working for paid-service, CROs have no intel-
lectual property rights in the compound that is being tested: they
receive their tasks and duties from their sponsors and hand over all
their data to them.
CROs reach out to doctors at private and public hospitals to act
as investigators on the trials, using lists that they build through
networks, conferences and other science fairs, and from the Clinical
Trials Registry of India. One interviewee said that their company
has 10,000e15,000 investigators in their database. CROs maintain
contacts with Principal Investigators and Clinical Research Co-
ordinators at the ‘sites’ where research is implemented (see also
Fisher, 2009; Petryna, 2009). Managerial staff in CROs describe
having good relationships with site staff but complain that their
work is regularly interrupted by aspirations for career mobility e
retention of CRAs in particular trials and CROs is described as a
challenge. CRAs monitor trials by visiting sites regularly and
auditing Case Report Forms where data of each participant is
recorded. One CRA might be monitoring several trials at the same
time, and the sites at which studies are conducted can be scattered
around India e CRAs make use of the expanding local aviation, and
travel incessantly between major research hubs and hospitals e
Bangalore, Chennai, Mumbai, Delhi, Hyderabad, Jaipur, Ahmedabad
in particular. CRAs look for protocol deviations (e.g. if the experi-
mental compound has been administrated at a wrong time) and
malpractices, like incomplete consent forms.
3.2. Collaborative models e outsourcing and offshoring
Though the harmonised everyday practices of CROs do not
signiﬁcantly differ from the international ones, our ﬁeldwork sug-
gests that novel types of ‘collaborations’ exist between sponsors
and CROs in India. At times these models blurred the distinctions
between biotech companies and fee-for-service clinical trial oper-
ations. For example, the head of an Indian CRO with close ties to an
Indian pharmaceuticals company described his collaborations as a
‘Web of dependencies, and there is a web within the web’. His clas-
siﬁcation of these webs illuminates clinical trials and the devel-
opment of pharmaceuticals as intertwined industries. We found
examples of all the six models among the CROs whose staff we
interviewed.
1) Outsourcing e Larger pharmaceutical and biotechnology com-
panies, sometimes a university, join up with a CRO. The former,
who usually develop the experimental compound, could be
national or regional players. Some companies have their own
clinical operations, but most of them are ‘lean’: they just handle
parts of the process, such as ‘Regulatory’, ‘Reporting’ or ‘Data
Management’, and outsource the rest of the operations. For
example, GSK and Merck use this model.
2) Small tie-ups e Smaller biotech companies (perhaps with 1e2
scientiﬁc personnel) outsource the entire product development
to CROs. Bigger/medium size (more than 12 people) companies
can handle some parts of the development process themselves.
They might outsource different parts of the process to different
bodies.
3) Preferred partnerships e Large international pharmaceutical
companies like Pﬁzer and MSD have preferred large interna-
tional CROs partners such as ICON and Quintiles. Their preferred
partner could offer them a full service or they might outsource
only part of their services. For example, Merck give all their lab
work to Coax wherever they are in the world.
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nology or pharmaceutical company, so that in future theywill be
contracted to run the clinical trial phases or other parts of the
process. Small companies with small budgets are earmarked by
CROs for this kind of investment.
5) Sub-contracting model e Companies might outsource all the
work or certain parts of the development process like a partic-
ular lab test. This might be a one-off relationship, or involve only
irregular contact, with no formal relationship.
6) Alliances and loose arrangements e Across regions, companies
purchase smaller ones through mergers and acquisitions, and
harmonise their Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).
Collaborative models described above illuminate the complexity
and versatility of the relationships between pharmaceuticals
companies and CROs. These models all reﬂect a market that is
commercial and ﬁnancially competitive. The models are as much
business models as they are clinical trials service arrangements,
and they were strategically tied in order to gain leverage in other
contracts, deals and developments. Still, interviewees described
how theywere rarely in a position to choosewho theyworkedwith
and what the arrangement was. While models 1 and 3 are more
common for global pharmaceutical alliances, models 2 and 4 are
novel, hybrid forms that Indian companies speciﬁcally use to work
towards innovation, either through co-development or producing
their own New Chemical Entities. We do not have sufﬁcient data to
compare the prevalence of these models and how many of each
kind there are in India, but within the sample of 11 CROs, only a few
were operating on the innovative models and everybody was
conducting fee-for-service contract research in addition to their
involvement in one or other of these innovative models.
As CROs manoeuvre within the Indian pharmaceutical sector,
two distinct moves are explicit. On the one hand, Indian biotech
companies try to expand into innovative research and develop-
ment, seeking access to international markets by tapping into the
funds of larger companies, while on the other hand international
partners wanting to venture to India require local expertise. Indian
companies need volume and capital. Discussing innovation, the
Head of a Human Pharmacology Unit that conducted Phase 1 and
Bioequivalence studies for an Indian CRO, described the Indian
pharmaceutical sector as resource-poor, which hinders innovation:
The Indian pharma industry is not that big. Who can afford to
develop such molecules and spend like a billion dollars on a
molecule? They can't afford to spend so much. Not possible.
I: Is that the direction that you see Indian pharmaceutical industry
going?
Yeah. Indian companies now want to be innovative centrally. So
everybody has big ambitions and keeps developing new relations
with the innovators and either co-development or on their own
start working on new molecules. But as expected, there's not so
much coming out of that in India.
The interviewee argued that Indian pharmaceutical companies
forge ties with sponsors because they have limited funds, which is
the primary motivation to enter into industrial collaborations. In-
ternational partners, on the other hand, need local expertise to
access Indian patients and markets. A president of an Indian CRO
explained how and why international sponsors team up with CROs
locally:
Some EU/US companies don't have the bandwidth to enter the
market here and the local regulatory insist on indigenous tests.Here, the president alludes to indigenous trials that give access
to Indianmarkets. The CROs conducted at least three different types
of trials: 1) multi-sited randomised control trials located in India,
often e but not always e sponsored by international pharmaceu-
tical companies; 2) phase 3b trials, small trials required by Indian
regulators before a drug is given access to Indian markets; this is a
special requirement for international pharmaceutical companies;
and 3) phase 1, bioequivalence and biosimilars research, imple-
mented especially by Indian companies but also by international
sponsors interested in generic drug production. This last model was
especially prevalent among Indian CRO-cum-biotechnology
companies.
With the increased research activity came responsibilities for
patient safety. Using internationally and nationally recognised
guidelines of good clinical practice, industry members held a
pragmatic stance whereby research and its risks could be rendered
controllable. In the next section we move from descriptions of
collaborative models and trials into how CROs staff described their
work, given the existing regulatory frameworks and research ca-
pacity in India.
3.3. Tensions in meaning of innovation and its consequences
Since 2005 and the increase of trials in India, some controversial
studies have been reported in Indian media, often depicting pa-
tients who died or fell ill following participation in a trial. The
depiction represents tensions in the ﬁeld. On the one hand, there
are national interests in developing an innovative pharmaceutical
industry, and clinical trials are seen as an inevitable part of that. On
the other, there are serious concerns about the price of innovation
and how it is achieved. A ﬁgure often repeated in themedia is about
500 deaths per year (Tribune New Service 22 Feb 2012; The Hindu 4
March 2013; Lloyd-Roberts 1 Nov 2012) but details of the trials, and
whether deaths were causally linked with the experimental com-
pounds or something else that coincided during a trial, are rarely
available. The numbers have been used in the public debate to
criticise clinical trials, multinational corporations and CROs. Im-
plicit in these accounts is often that international companies are
behind the damage. Our interviewees never spoke about
compensation in case of death or injury, and questions about such
cases were evaded.
Aware of the negative public attention, all industry actors
argued that they were committed to the safety of the research
subjects. They were quick to claim that trials were done to the
highest of standards and that they went out of their way to ensure
that patient safety was their priority. They referred to the training
given to doctors who recruited participants, and to their junior
staff, and to following international guidelines meticulously. The
CRO staff emphasised that it was in their interest to build up the
ﬁnal product towards a future approval from the US Food and Drug
Administration (USFDA) to gain access to the US market. Clearance
would be given subject to USFDA being satisﬁed that ethical and
scientiﬁcally sound research had been carried out. Dumit argues
that inbuilt into the pharmaceutical industry rhetoric is a certain
level of self-regulation (2012, p.88) so that they can be sure that
their data will be accepted by the USFDA: ‘The challenge is to have
the most efﬁcient development plan, within regulatory and ethical
constrains, that will provide the largest market and best return on
investment’ (2012, p.149). Similarly, our interviewees claimed that
not doing trials to scientiﬁc and ethical standards would prevent
the experimental ‘product’ from accessing the market. It is not
surprising that the industry has been heavily involved in shaping
clinical trials regulation both in India and internationally. A CRO
president claimed to have drafted the rules under Schedule Y
before the guidelines were sent out to public review and eventually
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headed an international CRO had helped train the Forum for Ethics
Review Committees of AsiaePaciﬁc (FERCAP), the pan-Asian non-
governmental organisation that aims to harmonise ethical review
in the region. FERCAP received funds and support initially from
Roche (Roche 2006, p.73). The best-known regulatory guideline,
the international ICH GCP, was drafted by an agglomeration of
global pharmaceutical companies and regulatory bodies (Abraham,
2002). We have no evidence of the involvement of the pharma-
ceutical industry in the regulations that were put in place in India in
2013; rather, it seems that the industry does not see the tightening
regulations favourably (Sachan 12 Nov 2013; The Economic Times
27 Jan 2014; The Hindu 10 Jan 2014).
A manager of operations in one of the largest CROs in the world,
based in India, exempliﬁed the concerns over the safety of partic-
ipants as follows:
Please remember, any failure which happens here, since we
contribute to 20e30 percent of global trials, will adversely affect
the result when the ﬁle or the data is reviewed by the USFDA, which
would lead to a commercial failure. So it's as critical as that. It's not
like we're the periphery and it's okay, you know, ‘we can live with
those mistakes’. No. It is critical that we do it in the right way, and
the whole clinical research industry. The safety of the patient is
paramount. I'm not bothered about your product. I'm not bothered
about what it does. Does it give a beneﬁt? Even if it doesn't, I'm
okay, but please don't harm the patient when you're conducting a
study. In a single sentence, that's where all of us are going. If your
patient is not safe, forget about it. Ultimately the way I look at it is
that you have subjects on one side, and the others on the other side.
All of us have equal, utmost responsibility to ensure that nothing
goes wrong with the subject.
The interviewee was aware of the realities of human experi-
mentation e people's lives were at stake, while there were also
commercial and scientiﬁc interests involved. Patients were at risk
because human experimentation is risky. Across the respondents,
there was no naïvete or ignorance about the fact that monetary and
human interests overlapped. Claims of exploitation emerged from
this overlap when and if one was seen to overtake the other.
Cases of corruption and deaths were described as having been
done by ‘ﬂy-by-night’ CROs who were solely motivated by mone-
tary interests and not ‘serious industry’. Malpractice was always
depicted as done by ‘others’. Those who positioned themselves as
ethical and scientiﬁc described these activities in terms of negli-
gence but also disparaged such CROs as ‘doing lousy business’ and
‘shooting themselves in the leg’. This rhetoric was vulnerable; for
example, at least one of the CROs that we interviewed was impli-
cated in a clinical trials controversy in Bhopal (Chattopadhyay,
2012; Lakhani, 2011). In Bhopal, the CROs that were embroiled
were both international as well as Indian (Lakhani, 2011).
On a rhetorical level, then, the industry representatives con-
cerned themselves with the well-being of the human subject of
research. They rarely raised questions about, for example, whether
the trialled compound was a ‘me-too’ drug e one that is very
similar to an existing product, where the company is merely trying
to get a share of the market, without offering any real therapeutic
advantage over the existing, patented, drug e or ‘ever-greened’, or
if there were likely to be tangible post-trial beneﬁts to the partic-
ipants in the trial. The industry representatives implied that there
was no need for further deliberation of the moral economy of the
pharmaceutical industry and their operations in developing coun-
tries and emerging economies if trials were done correctly and
according to GCP guidelines and capacity built to that effect.3.4. New social forms: capacity and new regulations
We discussed the capacity of investigators, junior staff and regu-
latory agencies in all the interviews. Doctors on site were often
described as good clinical practitioners but lacking in a research
mind-set and skills; investigators and junior staff were providedwith
training on GCP guidelines, soft skills like how to appropriately relate
to clinicians and other members of the industry, as well as general
knowledge about how the pharmaceutical industry operates. An in-
ternational CRO president described these changes as follows:
A lot of countries now recognise that clinical trials are not only a
growth business that generates a lot of foreign income with very
little investment in capital. Trials also bring you skills; it transfers
skills into the country. So for me to do a clinical trial in various
Asian countries and South Africa as well, I don't need to hire or
train my own people. I will train up the site; I will train the leader
authorities and so forth. You really need to build capacity in every
area in terms of doing clinical trials and it is not just across the
institutions, it is not just the investigators but all the supporting
staff including the laboratories.
Building new skill and capacities were needed to do trials ‘right’.
This is an example of Big-pharmaceuticalisation: these skills deal
with conducting trials according to the standards of the interna-
tional pharmaceutical industry emeticulous documentation of the
data collection, following the GCP guidelines appropriately, etc. The
above interviewee also suggested that changes took place across
multiple domains; capacity building was a part of perfecting the
overall knowledge production process, but was not nationally
harmonised or regulated.
Through the introduction of new regulations, skills and prac-
tices, the industry changed. Guidelines on subject protection,
documentation and audit practices increased. Our interviewees
described these changes as welcome, aiding the industry towards
innovative research. The skills utilised in the past mode of knowl-
edge production of reverse-engineered generics evolved into new
skills, which those working in such collaborations, described as
‘stepping stones’ towards innovation. For example, a CRO consul-
tant argued:
This knowledge which has been gained is what will make us better.
I think we're good at looking at something and imitating it, and
moving or increasing that process. Call it the generic mentality of
ours. So if you're doing something, I know what it is all about, I can
break it down, I can create a much better, more efﬁcient process.
Innovation is not something which we did. That's why I said, please
understand the policies where we were. We needed to create
something which we could sustain and afford. So that's how our
education is like that, we're brought up like that, the industry
works like that. Now we're coming out into the innovation mode.
Maybe in the next two generations, or maybe we won't be able to
get into a different this thing … But we're extremely good at
absorbing what is there, and creating better things, better pro-
cesses, better way of doing things.
With the new epistemic skills, the Indian industry was said to be
headed towards biosimilars, which are biological compounds more
complicated than generics. Still, they tend to reproduce something
like-with-like (but in more reﬁned forms) rather than completely
New Chemical Entities. While the old generics industry did not
need clinical trials for their marketing approvals, these biologics do.
According to the head of Operations of a Global CRO, this ‘hybrid’
space is very attractive to Indian companies:
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generic markets, they have been a generic player. In the recent past
what we have seen is that they are trying to go for exclusivity
period. But as per my personal observation, many of them are
getting into what we called as biosimilar space which is a hybrid
between generic and new drug development.
New epistemic skills for researchers, be they in the industry or
working on sites, alone was not seen to be enough to push for
innovative research cultures, however. Interviewees suggested that
for new products to emerge out of the Indian industry, regulatory
changes were required. The revision of Schedule Y led to what
many interviewees described as bottlenecks. A CEO described these
as follows:
See, security and freedom do not come together. Either we create a
secure environment or a free environment. What happens in se-
curity, they put a lot of bounds and boundaries so that people
cannot counter anything and you be safe, but the cost is going to
higher and higher and there are huge lapses. Now, what is going to
happen when the environment is very free? People can experiment,
people can do many things, they falter, they learn, but in best in-
terest of their funders.
Despite having been written to align with international phar-
maceutical industry and harmonising practices, Schedule Y differs
in small particulars from the ICH GCP guidelines. These differences
e such as the phase 1 restriction and introduction of the 3b phasee
were not criticised in the interviews as such. However, the gov-
ernment was heavily criticised for its inability to provide appro-
priate support, regulation and protection from unwarranted media
attacks as the number of trials increased. While the research
environment was deemed freer since 2005, and increasing capital
and resources allowed research to be done, approvals were often
delayed at the Drug Controller General's ofﬁce. The head of Oper-
ations of a Global CRO also felt that the regulatory changes in 2013
were reactions to scandals and did not give the industry a chance to
mature:
While the number of trials has increased, I don't think the regu-
latory ofﬁce has really ramped up their infrastructure to address
the needs of what is requested. There is rather a sense of vigilance. It
is bordered to the fact that vigilance has turned into the bottle-
necks. So now it's like the approving authority is a little reluctant to
give any approvals because they feel they don't want be in the eye
of storm. We are not saying that everything has been black and
white in clinical trials in India. There have been grey areas and we
acknowledge the facts that because we are just 12e13 years into
this industry, there are going to be areas of improvement.
This quote reﬂects on the negative public atmosphere for clinical
trials and the capacity of the regulatory ofﬁce to handle the
increased number of clinical trials. The potential of clinical trials for
innovation was seen to be difﬁcult to implement when regulations
and skills were only partially in place. Overall, the quotes show how
interviewees experienced the slow pace of changes in the institu-
tional environment e in human resource availability, legislation
and regulatory practices e compared to the rapid pace of change in
the industry.4. Conclusion
Clinical research is an important dimension of nation building
(President of an international CRO in India).Despite the promises and hype justifying the new patent
regime, the impact of TRIPS agreement on Indian companies' ability
to bring new chemical entities to the market has been modest,
whereas the increase in clinical trial activity has e until the recent
downturn caused by more stringent interpretation of regulatory
conditionse been phenomenal. In this paper we have extended the
concept of pharmaceuticalisation (Abraham, 2010, 2011; Davis and
Abraham, 2013; Williams et al., 2011) whereby drugs are increas-
ingly seen as solutions to health concerns and create new sub-
jectivities and structures of governance for their production, to
suggest how research on pharmaceuticals and the associated tools
of knowledge production travel to new contexts. The globalisation
of pharmaceutical knowledge production in India has taken shape
with the backdrop of India's large generics industry and Big-phar-
maceuticalisation has brought about a rapid concentration of capi-
tal, new social forms, and public contests about clinical trial
participants' well-being. Following Strathern (2011), we suggest
that looking at how change is created illuminates how methods
shape outcomes.
The enormous expansion of trial activity in India has required
the active involvement of local corporations and researchers.
Within pharmaceutical research organisations, we identiﬁed a ‘web
within a web’ of collaborations between international and Indian
partners. Indian CROs serviced both international and Indian
pharmaceutical companies while international CROs are more
likely to have tie-ups with international pharma. While interna-
tional CROsmight work with Indian pharmaceutical companies, we
found no evidence of this. Other outsourced auxiliary services
include lab tests, accounting, etc. which we have not focused on. By
2010e2012, when our research was conducted, there was an
overlap between companies aiming to do innovative drug discov-
ery e the objective of signing the TRIPS agreement e and com-
panies that were collaborating with international pharmaceutical
companies offering outsourced services, suggesting that Indian
pharmaceutical industry has become hybridised. Through skills
building, networking andmerging, some companies were using the
CROs and pharmaceutical companies to gain international promi-
nence. The regulatory changes in 2005e introduction of innovative
patent regimes and lenience on clinical trials e have created con-
nections on the ground through CROs. Thus, in this paper we have
broadened existing literature on CROs (Fisher, 2009; Petryna, 2009)
by showing how CROs in India not only implement the research but
change existing research industries.
Part of the Big-pharmaceuticalisation process is changes in
ethical and political concerns regarding pharmaceuticals and their
regulation. Between 2005 and 2013, changes in the TRIPS agree-
ment and Schedule Yof the Indian Drugs and Cosmetics Act had not
taken place hand in handwith regulatory capacity to govern clinical
trials. With the controversies that have taken place, new concerns
have arisen in the ethical debates concerning pharmaceuticals.
While access to drugs remains part of the discourse of drug
development, a motivator for commercial researchers, and a
concern over the public health beneﬁts after trials are over for the
civil society, the primary concern of the commercial researchers
was the safety of research participants. Failure to control risks on
human subjects and maintain high ethical standards was always
externalised to ‘other’ CROs and their operations. But Indian CROs,
and possibly Indian companies, have been included in the contro-
versial trials that have taken place. This adds complexity to the
common perception that those whowere to blame for malpractices
were always international players.
Still, the precedent for the form of innovation and kind of
research is characterised by Big-pharmaceuticalisation and the era
of clinical trials. While Indian biotech and pharmaceutical
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New Chemical Entities (especially Phase 1 trials), bioequivalence
and biosimilars studies with CROs, international pharmaceutical
companies outsourcing their research to India were still the largest
players in the ﬁeld. While India's pharmaceutical sector is being
inﬂuenced by Big Pharma into changing their operational practices
in-line with international ones and is starting to look more like the
international pharmaceutical sector, most of the trials that we
studied were conducted by international sponsors in conjunction
with international or Indian CROs. In those cases the role of CROs
had little to do with innovative knowledge production within India
as such. Using clinical trials to move Indian research cultures to-
wards innovation still has to demonstrate that it can lead to sus-
tainable innovations. While outsourcing and offshoring has
brought about a “hybridization” of innovation and operations, it is
not clear that engaging in these down-stream activities will enable
moves upstream in the knowledge-producing hierarchy. As of
today, Big-pharmaceuticalisation and clinical trials by CROs in India
serve primarily as vehicles for generating universal data for the
international pharmaceutical industry and facilitating access to
large Indian markets rather than meeting the objective of local
knowledge production.Acknowledgements
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